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SILENCING THE LOOSE CANNON: THE NEED
FOR THE BANKRUPTCY CODE TO
RECOGNIZE LETTERS OF CREDIT
Juliet M. Moringiello*
I. INTRODUCTION
The world of commercial law is witnessing two parallel law revi-
sions, that of Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which
governs letters of credit,1 and that of the Bankruptcy Code (Code).2 This
time of revision presents the legal community with the ideal opportunity
to address problems that have arisen in past attempts to reconcile appar-
ent conflicts between these two statutes, and in particular, the problem of
whether a court can ever enjoin payment of a letter of credit because of
an account party's bankruptcy.
Since 1979 when the decision in Twist Cap, Inc. v. Southeast Bank
(In re Twist Cap, Inc.)3 shocked the financial world by allowing a court
to enjoin payment on letters of credit as voidable preferences in the ac-
count party's bankruptcy, courts have wrestled with the problem of the
courts' power to enjoin payment of standby letters of credit4 in bank-
* Assistant Professor, Widener University School of Law. B.S.F.S. Georgetown Uni-
versity, 1984; J.D. Fordham University, 1987; LL.M. Temple University, 1993. I would like
to thank my research assistant, Dianna Leach, for her able assistance, and Professor Amelia H.
Boss of Temple Law School for her helpful suggestions and critiques of earlier drafts.
1. In 1990 the Business Law Section of the American Bar Association created a task
force to study Article 5. LIC Trends Whence the Revision of U.S. UCC Article 5?, LETTER
OF CREDIT UPDATE (Gov't Info. Servs.) at 3, 3 (Mar. 1993) [hereinafter LIC Trends]. The
Letter of Credit Update contains a good summary of the Article 5 revision process, as well as a
copy of the January 29, 1993 draft of Article 5.
2. S. 540, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
3. 1 B.R. 284 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1979).
4. Letters of credit are of two general types: commercial credits and standby credits.
Originally, letters of credit were used exclusively in commercial sales transactions in order to
reduce the risk of nonpayment of the purchase price under a contract for the sale of goods.
See JOHN F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETTERS OF CREDIT: COMMERCIAL AND STANDBY
CREDITS 1 1.04 (2d ed. 1991). Commercial letters of credit serve as a payment mechanism,
and draws on commercial credits are expected in the ordinary course of business. JAMES J.
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 19-1 (3d ed. 1988). Gener-
ally, standby letters of credit are used in nonsales settings in order to reduce the risk of nonper-
formance under a contract that calls for performance. Id. Some common uses of standby
letters of credit include securing the developer's equity in real estate development projects,
securing subdivision improvements in connection with obligations under municipal regulation,
see Kerr Constr. Co. v. Plains Nat'l Bank, 753 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), and guaran-
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ruptcy proceedings.- In the cases since Twist Cap, courts have suffered
from a lack of statutory guidance on the issue. Article 5 of the UCC does
not provide for an account party's bankruptcy.6 The Code, on the other
hand, does not mention letters of credit.7 Consequently, courts have
been left to strike the balance between letter of credit and bankruptcy
policies, reaching conflicting results.'
In two 1991 cases, Wysko Investment Co. v. Great American Bank 9
and In re Delaware River Stevedores, Inc. 10 the courts used their powers
under § 105 of the Code-which allows the bankruptcy court to issue
injunctions that are "necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions
of [the Code]" 11-to enjoin payment on letters of credit. In both cases a
provision in the letter of credit allowed the beneficiary to draw upon the
letter of credit in the event of the account party's bankruptcy,12 although
the beneficiary in Delaware River Stevedores claimed that it requested the
draw because of the account party's failure to make payments.1 3 In
Wysko, the district court upheld the bankruptcy court's finding that the
injunction against payment of the letter of credit was necessary for reor-
ganization,14 relying on cases that permitted injunctions against third
teeing payment of revenue and development bonds, see Prime Motor Inns, Inc. v. First Fidel-
ity Bank N.A. N.J. (In re Prime Motor Inns, Inc.), 123 B.R. 104 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.), vacated,
134 B.R. 445 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990) (supplemental opinion), rev'd, 130 B.R. 610 (S.D. Fla.
1991); Diamond Mach. Co. v. Casco N. Bank (In re Diamond Mach. Co.), 95 B.R. 255
(Bankr. D. Me. 1988).
5. See generally American Bank v. Leasing Serv. Corp. (In re Air Conditioning, Inc.),
845 F.2d 293 (11th Cir.), cerL denied, 488 U.S. 993 (1988); Kellogg v. Blue Quail Energy, Inc.
(In re Compton Corp.), 831 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1987), reh'g granted, 835 F.2d 584 (5th Cir.
1988) (per curiam); Prime Motor Inns, Inc., 123 B.R. 104; Page v. First Nat'l Bank (In re
Page), 18 B.R. 713 (D.D.C. 1982).
6. See U.C.C. § 5-102 (1990).
7. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
8. Compare Wysko Inv. Co. v. Great Am. Bank, 131 B.R. 146 (D. Ariz. 1991) (granting
injunction) and Prime Motor Inns, Inc. v. First Fidelity Bank N.A. N.J. (In re Prime Motor
Inns, Inc.), 130 B.R. 610 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (granting injunction) and In re Delaware River
Stevedores, Inc., 129 B.R. 38 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (granting injunction) with Zenith Labs. v.
Security Pac. Nat'l Trust Co. (In re Zenith Labs., Inc.), 104 B.R. 667 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989)
(denying injunction) and Diamond Mach. Co., 95 B.R. 255 (denying injunction).
9. 131 B.R. 146. In Wysko, the debtor obtained a letter of credit to secure its obligation
to purchase an apartment complex. Id. at 146. Upon the debtor's bankruptcy filing, the bene-
ficiary sought to draw upon the letter. Id. The debtor sought to substitute a certificate of
deposit as security for its obligation to the beneficiary. Id.
10. 129 B.R. 38. In Delaware River Stevedores, the letter of credit was issued to secure the
debtor's obligations as a self-insurer in the Department of Labor's Workmen's Compensation
Program. Id at 39.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988).
12. Delaware River Stevedores, 129 B.R. at 39; Wysko, 131 B.R. at 146.
13. Delaware River Stevedores, 129 B.R. at 41.
14. Wysko, 131 B.R. at 147.
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parties when "unusual facts" were present. 5 In Delaware River Steve-
dores, the court granted a conditional stay pending a showing that pay-
ment on the letter of credit would cause irreparable harm to the estate."6
Cases such as Wysko and Delaware River Stevedores necessitate an
analysis of the sometimes conflicting policies of the Bankruptcy Code
and letter of credit law: Chapter 1 l's primary goals are equal treatment
of similarly situated creditors and rehabilitation of the debtor, and the
governing policy of letter of credit law is embodied in the independence
principle. 7
The conflicts between the UCC, as adopted by the various states,
and federal law have long been recognized by various commentators.' 8
Issues have arisen under the Bankruptcy Code that were virtually un-
known in 1978, when the Code was enacted. Issues such as leveraged
buyouts, the integration of the global economy, and environmental
problems have prompted Congress to propose the creation of a National
Bankruptcy Review Commission to study problems related to the
Code. 9 The growth in standby letter of credit use is undoubtedly among
the commercial realities not anticipated by Congress in drafting the
Code. From 1950 to 1990, the dollar amount of letters of credit out-
standing in the United States grew from one-half billion dollars to two
hundred billion dollars, due in part to the development and acceptance of
the standby letter of credit.2" Therefore, those responsible for revising
15. The court relied on Oberg v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (In re A.H. Robins Co.),
828 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 969 (1988). In Oberg appellants repre-
senting over 4000 Dalkon Shield claimants sought to sue Robins's insurer, Aetna, during the
bankruptcy case. Id. at 1024. The court stayed the suits, invoking § 105, finding that Aetna
would have to involve the officers, directors, and employees of Robins, which would exhaust
their energies and thus interfere with Robins's reorganization. Id at 1025-26.
16. 129 B.R. at 43.
17. The paramount goal of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is rehabilitation of the
debtor. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984). The governing policy of letter
of credit law is the independence principle, under which letters of credit are considered in-
dependent of the underlying transaction. Tudor Dev. Group v. United States Fidelity & Guar-
antee Co., 968 F.2d 357, 366 (3d Cir. 1992). Strict adherents to the independence principle
believe that an account party seeking to enjoin payment of a letter of credit should only suc-
ceed on the merits when the documents are defective on their face or when there is fraud or
forgery. DOLAN, supra note 4, % 11.04, at 11-30.
18. See, e.g., Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Introduction to the Uniform Commercial Code An-
nual Survey: Some Observations on the Past, Present, and Future of the U. C. C, 41 Bus. LAW.
1343 (1986); E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Foreword: Federalism or Uniformity of Commercial Law,
11 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 527 (1980).
19. 139 CONG. Rmc. S2626 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1993) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
20. James E. Byrne, Present Problems with U. CC Article 5, Preamble to an Examination
of U.CC Article 5 (Letters of Credit), 45 Bus. LAW. 1521, 1531 (1990).
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the UCC and the Code should take this opportunity to harmonize the
Code and the independence principle.
This Article examines bankruptcy and letter of credit policies to de-
termine whether it is ever appropriate for a court to enjoin payment on a
letter of credit because of the account party's bankruptcy.21 First, this
Article disputes the notion that when an issuer pays on a letter of credit
it violates the Code's prohibition of ipso facto clauses,22 and suggests that
the Bankruptcy Code should be revised to specifically exclude letter of
credit transactions from the prohibition of ipso facto clauses. Then, this
Article shows that when courts considering whether to enjoin payment of
letters of credit apply the four factors of the traditional preliminary in-
junction test,23 they should never find it permissible to enjoin payment of
letters of credit in bankruptcy. Finally, this Article concludes that the
Code should be revised to prohibit injunctions against draws on letters of
credit.
24
II. THE INDEPENDENCE PRINCIPLE
The independence principle distinguishes letters of credit from other
payment devices, such as guarantees and surety contracts. A letter of
credit transaction consists of three separate contracts: (1) the letter of
credit from the issuer-often a bank-to the beneficiary, under which the
issuer promises to pay the beneficiary upon presentation of specified doc-
uments; 25 (2) the underlying contract between the beneficiary and the
21. Traditionally, courts have refused to enjoin payment on letters of credit in the absence
of fraud. See United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 360 N.E.2d 943, 948
(N.Y. 1976); Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1941);
Intraworld Indus. v. Girard Trust Bank, 336 A.2d 316 (Pa. 1975). Section 5-114(2) of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) permits a court of appropriate jurisdiction to enjoin an
issuer from honoring a letter of credit if the letter is forged or fraudulent or if there is "fraud in
the transaction."
22. The Code prohibits the termination or modification of an executory contract of the
debtor based solely upon the debtor's bankruptcy filing. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (1988).
23. The four factors of the preliminary injunction test are: (1) possibility of irreparable
harm to the debtor's estate; (2) likelihood of success on the merits; (3) whether the possible
harm to the estate outweighs the possible harm to the beneficiary; and (4) the public interest.
DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 187-88 (2d ed. 1993). See also e.g., In re Delaware River
Stevedores, Inc., 129 B.R. 38, 42 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991); Dore & Assocs. Contracting, Inc. v.
American Druggists' Ins. Co. (In re Dore & Assocs. Contracting, Inc.), 54 B.R. 353, 357
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985); Otero Mills, Inc. v. Security Bank & Trust (In re Otero Mills, Inc.),
21 B.R. 777, 779 (Bankr. D.N.M.), affid, 25 B.R. 1018 (D.N.M. 1982).
24. An exception to this policy would arise when the letter of credit is issued on account of
an antecedent debt within the preference period. See infra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
25. In order to receive payment, the beneficiary under a standby letter of credit must cer-
tify to the issuing bank that his or her obligor, the account party, has not performed. DOLAN,
supra note 4, 1 1.04.
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account party, under which the account party promises some perform-
ance to the beneficiary; and (3) the reimbursement agreement between
the account party and the issuer, under which the account party
promises to repay the issuer if the issuer is required to pay under the
letter of credit.26 By operation of the independence principle, if the bene-
ficiary presents documents to the issuer that conform to the requirements
of the letter of credit, the issuer may not refer to the underlying contract
between its customer and the beneficiary to determine whether to honor
demand for payment."
The risk of an account party's inability to pay is the very risk the
beneficiary seeks to avoid by requesting a letter of credit. A letter of
credit permits a beneficiary to substitute the known and secure credit of
an issuing bank for the unknown and perhaps risky credit of an account
party.2" A letter of credit permits a bank or other issuer that is familiar
with an account party's financial strength to substitute its evaluation of
the account party for the beneficiary's evaluation.29 Consequently, a let-
ter of credit shifts the risk of nonpayment from the beneficiary to the
issuer. Thus arises the problem of letters of credit in the bankruptcy
context: If an account party files a bankruptcy petition after an issuer
issues a letter of credit, but before the beneficiary draws upon the letter of
credit, the issuer must honor the beneficiary's draft even though the ac-
count party might not be able to pay the issuer.
Both the UCC and the Uniform Customs and Practices for Docu-
mentary Credits (UCP) codify the independence principle. The UCC, in
section 5-109, relieves an issuer from liability for performance of the un-
derlying contract and for lack of knowledge of particular trade usages.30
Section 5-114(1) of the UCC requires an issuer to honor demands for
payment that comply with the terms of the relevant letter of credit re-
gardless of whether the goods or documents conform to the underlying
26. it 2.01.
27. The, issuer must pay the beneficiary even when the beneficiary has nonfraudulently
breached the underlying contract. Jupiter Orrington Corp. v. Zweifel, 469 N.E.2d 590, 592
(Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
28. See Diamond Mach. Co. v. Casco N. Bank (In re Diamond Mach. Co.), 95 B.R. 255,
258 (Bankr. D. Me. 1988). The independence principle furthers the original purpose of letters
of credit. Merchants originally used letters of credit as a method of reducing the uncertainties
that result when a seller sells goods in a foreign land. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hartford
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 378 A.2d 562, 565 (Conn. 1977).
29. DOLAN, supra note 4, 3.07[2].
30. U.C.C. § 5-109 (1990) states:
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contract between the account party and the beneficiary.31 The UCP
states the independence principle explicitly in Article 3: Letters of credit,
by their nature, are separate transactions from the sales or other con-
tract(s) on which they may be based and banks are in no way concerned
with or bound by such contract(s), even if any reference whatsoever to
such contract(s) is included in the credit."32 The drafters of the pro-
posed revised Article 5 have suggested the independence principle be ex-
plicitly defined in the black letter of Article 5, thus codifying the primacy
of the independence principle to letter of credit law.33
The independence principle gives the letter of credit a special place
in the world of commercial financing, a place that letters of credit have
occupied since at least the seventeenth century.34 The letter of credit is
an economical and practical financing device because the issuer's receipt,
examination, and payment of the documents accompanying a draft can
be achieved in a standardized and inexpensive manner.35 A banker
should be able to sit at a desk and determine, solely by looking at papers,
whether or not the bank must make payment. Bankers, or other issuers,
(1) An issuer's obligation to its customer includes good faith and observance of any
general banking usage but unless otherwise agreed does not include liability or re-
sponsibility
(a) for performance of the underlying contract for sale or other transaction be-
tween the customer and the beneficiary; or
(b) for any act or omission of any person other than itself or its own branch or
for loss or destruction of a draft, demand or document in transit or in the possession
of others; or
(c) based on knowledge or lack of knowledge of any usage or any particular
trade.
31. U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1990) provides:
An issuer must honor a draft or demand for payment which complies with the terms
of the relevant credit regardless of whether the goods or documents conform to the
underlying contract for sale or other contract between the customer and the benefici-
ary. The issuer is not excused from honor of such a draft or demand by reason of an
additional general term that all documents must be satisfactory to the issuer, but an
issuer may require that specified documents must be satisfactory to it.
32. UNIFoRm CUSTOMS AND PRACTCE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS art. 3 (1983)
(UCP). This is known as UCP 400. In January, 1994, a revised UCP, UCP 500, will take
effect. See ABA Experts Provide Update on UCP, UCC, Uncitral Projects, 61 Banking Rep.
(BNA) No. 8, at 335 (Aug. 30, 1993).
33. The January 29, 1993 draft of Article 5 defines the independence principle by stating
that "[t]he duties of the issuer are independent of the performance of [the underlying] con-
tracts," and that the independence principle is a central part of letter of credit law. LIC
Trends, supra note 1, at 37.
34. DOLAN, supra note 4, 3.02. Some have traced the use of letters of credit to even
earlier times. See, eg., Boris Kozolchyk, The Legal Nature of the Irrevocable Commercial
Letter of Credit, 14 AM. J. CoMP. L. 395 (1965) (tracing use of letters of credit to 12th
century).
35. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust, 378 A.2d 562, 566 (Conn.
1977).
LETTERS OF CREDIT IN BANKRUPTCY
are not permitted to go into the field and determine whether the underly-
ing contract has been performed.36 The UCP sets forth this aspect of the
independence principle by stating, in Article 4: "In credit operations all
parties concerned deal in documents, and not in goods, services and/or
other performances to which the documents may relate."37 The indepen-
dence principle thus assures letter of credit beneficiaries prompt pay-
ment, and any delay in payment will diminish the benefit of the letter of
credit as a commercial device.3" Letters of credit are characterized by
this prompt payment feature, which allows payment to be made after
examining documents at a bank officer's desk.39 One advantage of a let-
ter of credit is that the beneficiary can rely on assured, prompt payment
from a solvent party, accompanied by the expectation that there will be a
minimum of litigation and judicial interference.' The independence
principle is thus at odds with two major components of the Code: the
concept that all creditors should be treated without preference,41 and the
automatic stay of § 362, which halts all actions against the debtor and
property of the estate while the bankruptcy case is pending.
Debtors have often argued that courts should use § 105 of the Code
to extend the automatic stay to letters of credit. Section 105 allows bank-
ruptcy judges to take any action "necessary or appropriate to carry out
the provisions" of the Code.42 Courts and commentators differ as to the
scope of § 105. Some favor a broad reading, believing that certain goals
of the Code are implied but not stated in the statutory language, and that
§ 105 should give bankruptcy courts authority to fill in the gaps left by
36. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 4, § 19-2.
37. UCP, supra note 32, art. 4.
38. DOLAN, supra note 4, 3.07[7].
39. Id. 2.10[1].
40. New York Life Ins. Co., 378 A.2d at 566. Although standby letters of credit are used
to guarantee an account party's obligations to a beneficiary, it is essential to distinguish
standby letters of credit from guarantees. One major difference between the two is that, under
a guarantee, the guarantor's obligation to the creditor-beneficiary is secondary-that is, it de-
pends upon the existence of an obligation on the part of the principal/account party-while
under a letter of credit, the issuer's obligation to the beneficiary is primary. Thus, while a
guarantor can assert any defenses that a principal has against a creditor, a letter of credit issuer
may not. WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 4, § 19-2; see also New York Life Ins. Co., 378 A.2d
at 565. In addition, although under a guarantee, the guarantor's obligation cannot mature
until the principal has actually defaulted, actual default is irrelevant to an issuer's obligations
under a letter of credit-the issuer must make payment upon the proper presentation of docu-
ments. WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 4, § 19-2. Thus, the determination of a guarantor's
liability under a guarantee requires a lengthy, complicated, and costly examination of the prin-
cipal obligor's conduct; the determination of an issuer's liability upon a letter of credit does
not.
41. See infra notes 48-74 and accompanying text.
42. 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1988).
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the statutory language.4 3 Others believe that § 105 is not a broad writ,
that it should be narrowly construed, and that an exercise of § 105 power
should be tied to another Code section and not merely to a general bank-
ruptcy concept or objective.44
Debtors seeking to use § 105 to enjoin payment on letters of credit
rely on it because letters of credit are not protected by the Code's auto-
matic stay provisions. Litigants have asked courts to use § 105 to grant
various types of relief. In most cases, a party requests an injunction in
proceedings against a nondebtor party who is not protected by the auto-
matic stay. These cases include those in which a nondebtor partner or
corporate officer of a debtor seeks to enjoin litigation against him- or
herself, and those in which a guarantor of the debtor's debt seeks to en-
join enforcement of the guarantee.45 Additionally, courts have addressed
the applicability of § 105 to other forms of relief, such as using the sec-
tion to allow several debtors to consolidate their plans of reorganiza-
tion,' or relying on it as a basis for dismissing a Chapter 7 case.4'
III. RECENT CASE LAW REGARDING LETTERS OF CREDIT IN
BANKRUPTCY
The controversy surrounding the treatment of letters of credit in
bankruptcy began when the court in Twist Cap, Inc. v. Southeast Bank
(In re Twist Cap, Inc.) enjoined payment on three letters of credit, finding
that payment of the letters of credit issued for the account of the debtor
43. 2 WILLLAM M. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 105.01[3] (Lawrence P. King
et al. eds., 15th ed. 1993).
44. Id. The court in Sinkow v. Latimer stated that "invocation of § 105(a) should be
reserved for a truly 'extraordinary set of circumstances'.... It is not to be employed as a loose
cannon." 82 B.R. 354, 364 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (citations omitted).
45. See eg., University Medical Ctr. v. American Sterilizer Co. (In re University Medical
Ctr.), 82 B.R. 754 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (refusing to enjoin medical malpractice suits against
debtor-partnership's partners because all claims would be covered by insurance and suits
would not demand much of partners' time); Kasual Kreation, Inc. v. Heller Fin., Inc. (In re
Kasual Kreation, Inc.), 54 B.R. 915 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (enjoining actions against guaran-
tors of corporate debt when guarantors were officers of corporation and their time would be
needed to operate debtor's business during holiday season); Otero Mills, Inc. v. Security Bank
& Trust (In re Otero Mills, Inc.), 21 B.R. 777 (Bankr. D.N.M.), affid, 25 B.R. 1018 (D.N.M.
1982) (enjoining enforcement of state court judgment against debtor's president who guaran-
teed loan to debtor because president was going to contribute personal assets to debtor to effect
bankruptcy plan and because enforcing judgment might detrimentally pressure debtor).
46. Bruce Energy Centre, Ltd. v. Orfa Corp. (In re Orfa Corp.), 129 B.R. 404 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1991).
47. Sinkow, 82 B.R. at 364.
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would result in preferential treatment of the creditor-beneficiaries.4"
Southeast Bank issued the letters of credit on behalf of Twist Cap in
December 1977, June 1978, and March 1979.19 In August 1979 Twist
Cap filed a petition for relief under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act
and sought an order restraining Southeast Bank from honoring the let-
ters of credit.5" In granting Twist Cap's request for an injunction, the
court stated that
to permit these two unsecured creditors to receive a payment,
possibly in full, on the pre-petition indebtedness owed to them
by the debtor would amount to an impermissible preferential
treatment of these two unsecured creditors which is contrary to
the scheme of Chapter XI and would certainly be counter-
productive to the debtor's efforts to obtain rehabilitation.51
The court in Twist Cap failed to recognize the special place of letters of
credit in the business world, and also failed to consider the possibility of
any harm to the beneficiary or the public interest.
The Twist Cap case was almost universally criticized for throwing
into doubt the validity of a useful commercial financing device.52 Courts
in many subsequent cases refused to enjoin payment of letters of credit
because enjoining payment would "frustrate the commercial purposes of
letters of credit to the detriment of financial institutions as well as their
customers.
53
In refusing to enjoin payment of a letter of credit, the court in Page
Associates v. First National Bank (In re Page) respected the purpose of
48. 1 B.R. 284, 285 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1979). In Twist Cap, the court granted injunctive
relief to the debtor under the predecessor to § 105 of the Code, § 2(a)(15) of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898. Id at 286.
49. Id at 285.
50. Id
51. Id
52. See Douglas G. Baird, Standby Letters of Credit in Bankruptcy, 49 U. CHI. L. REv.
130 (1982). The Twist Cap case disrupted the practice of issuing commercial paper backed by
standby letters of credit because, as a result of Twist Cap, Standard and Poor's refused to rate
paper of that type. Counsel's Corner: Letter of Credit Collateral-A Spur to the Wary, 98
BANKING L.J. 579 (1981).
53. Page Assocs. v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Page), 18 B.R. 713, 717 (D.D.C. 1982); see also
Kellogg v. Blue Quail Energy, Inc. (In re Compton Corp.), 831 F.2d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 1987),
reh'g granted, 835 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that independence is cornerstone of letter
of credit law); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, 595 F.2d 171, 175-76 (3d Cir. 1979)
(finding that letters of credit have grown and flourished because of certainty they provide);
Pringle-Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 571 F.2d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1978)
(allowing enjoinment of payment would make letters of credit lose value as guarantee of pay-
ment); Armstrong v. FNB Fin. Co. (In re Clothes, Inc.), 35 B.R. 487, 489 (Bankr. D.N.D.
1983) (permitting payment of letter of credit and stating that following Twist Cap "would be
wholly contrary to long established commercial law principles").
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standby letters of credit-the intended substitution of a bank for its less
credit-worthy customer-and held that if an injunction were to issue,
then the letter of credit would become a dubious device for securing
credit.5 4 The court denied the injunction on several important grounds.
First, cashing the letter of credit would not divest the estate of property
because neither the letter of credit nor its proceeds are property of the
estate under the Code.5 In issuing a letter of credit, a bank commits to
pay a beneficiary out of its own assets, not the assets of its customer.
Second, the district court in Page rejected the bankruptcy court's
finding that cashing the letter of credit would violate the automatic stay
as an act to "create, perfect or enforce" a lien in the property securing
the debtor's obligation to indemnify the bank. 6 According to the Page
court, cashing a letter of credit is not an act to enforce a lien, because,
although the bank will have a claim against the debtor, that claim will be
subject to the automatic stay.s7 Although cashing a letter of credit gives
rise to a bank's claim against the debtor pursuant to the reimbursement
agreement,5" that claim would not divest the estate of any property, as
enforcement of that claim would be subject to the automatic stay. 9 The
court also held that cashing the letter of credit did not constitute a
postpetition transfer of property under § 549 of the Code."
However, the Page court held out the possibility that an injunction
might, in certain circumstances, be appropriate. The debtor contended
that funding of the letter of credit would affect the filing of the debtor's
reorganization plan.6 Although the court recognized the broad power
54. Page, 18 B.R. at 717. The bankruptcy court in Page had granted the debtor's request
for an injunction. Id at 714; see also Planes, Inc. v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp. (In re Planes,
Inc.), 29 B.R. 370, 371 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983) (refusing to issue injunction against payment
of letter of credit because doing so would seriously impair important commercial function of
letters of credit).
55. A debtor's bankruptcy estate is comprised of "all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988).
56. Page, 18 B.R. at 717.
57. Id at 716.
58. The issuing bank has a contingent claim against the account party debtor at the time
the account party debtor signs the reimbursement agreement. However, the bank gains the
immediate right to payment of that claim at the time that the bank pays on the letter of credit.
U.C.C. § 5-114(3) (1988) ("Unless otherwise agreed an issuer which has duly honored a draft
or demand for payment is entitled to immediate reimbursement of any payment made under
the credit . . ").
59. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (1988) provides that filing of a petition operates as a stay of "any
act to create, perfect or enforce any lien against property of the estate."
60. Page, 18 B.R. at 716. The Code, in § 549, provides that a trustee may avoid a transfer
of property of the estate made "after the commencement of the case" and that is either unau-
thorized by the court or is authorized under § 303(f) or § 542(c). 11 US.C. § 549 (1988).
61. Page, 18 B.R. at 717.
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of the bankruptcy court to "'do whatever is necessary to aid its jurisdic-
tion,"' the court found no evidence that an injunction would aid the
preparation of a successful plan.62 Here, the court found that since the
bank would be subject to the automatic stay, the debtor would be pro-
vided adequate breathing space to attempt to work out its financial affairs
as intended by the Code.6" To the extent the bank's liens constrain the
debtor's use of its property in continuing its business or rearranging its
affairs, this constraint would be the same whether or not the letter of
credit was cashed. 6" However, while opening the door to the possibility
of injunctive relief, the Page court failed to provide any guidance as to
whether or when an injunction of a letter of credit would be appropriate.
Courts have routinely refused, however, to allow creditors to secure
existing unsecured debts with secured letters of credit on the eve of bank-
ruptcy. The problem of the letter of credit as a preferential transfer was
addressed in Kellogg v. Blue Quail (In re Compton Corp.)65 and American
Bank v. Leasing Service Corp. (In re Air Conditioning, Inc.).66 In both
cases the court allowed the bankruptcy trustee to recover the property
transferred-the collateral securing payment of the letter of credit.67
Both courts held that such a transfer made within ninety days of a
debtor's bankruptcy filing was a transfer "for the benefit of a creditor"
and was thus a voidable preference under § 547(b) of the Code.6"
In Kellogg, the court rejected Twist Cap by stating that a court can-
not enjoin payment of funds under a letter of credit because such a pay-
62. Id (quoting 2 WILLIAM M. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 105.02,
at 105-4 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 3d ed. 1993)).
63. Id.
64. Id
65. 831 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1987), reh'ggranted, 835 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
66. 845 F.2d 293 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 993 (1988).
67. Id at 299.
68. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988) allows a trustee in bankruptcy to
avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer
was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of the peti-
tion, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if-
(A) the case were a case under Chapter 7 of [the Code];
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the
provisions of [the Code].
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ment is not a transfer of a debtor's property.69 The trustee in Kellogg,
however, was asking to set aside the transfer of the increased collateral.
The collateral pledged as security for the letter of credit is property of the
estate.71 The Fifth Circuit ordered Blue Quail, the beneficiary of the let-
ter of credit, to return the value of the transferred collateral to the estate
because the letter of credit was issued on account of an antecedent debt
on the eve of bankruptcy.72 The court felt that its holding would not
affect the strength of the proper use of the letter of credit.73 The court in
American Bank followed suit, again allowing the letter of credit to be
drawn upon, but ordering the collateral transferred to be returned to the
trustee.74
Prime Motor Inns, Inc. v. First Fidelity Bank N.A. N.J. (In re Prime
Motor Inns, Inc.)75 reopened the dialogue on the sanctity of letters of
credit. There, the debtor, Prime Motor Inns, had financed the cost of
constructing several hotels through the issuance of industrial revenue
bonds through the New Jersey Economic Development Authority.
76
The bonds were secured by letters of credit issued on Prime Motor Inns'
account to the indenture trustee. The trust indentures executed in con-
nection with the bonds provided that the debtor's bankruptcy would con-
stitute an event of default entitling the beneficiary to draw.77 The
indenture trustee admitted that the debtor's bankruptcy filing constituted
the only default. The bankruptcy court made much of this fact in grant-
ing the injunction.78 The district court, in reversing the bankruptcy
court, found that the draw did not violate the anti-ipso facto provisions
of the Code and additionally found that it would be in the public interest
to allow the draw.79 The court found that enjoining payment would de-
69. Kellogg, 831 F.2d at 589.
70. Id
71. Id at 590.
72. Id at 596.
73. Id In Kellogg, the debtor induced MBank to issue a letter of credit for the benefit of
one of the debtor's suppliers one day before an involuntary bankruptcy petition was filed
against the debtor. Id at 589.
74. American Bank, 845 F.2d at 298-99. In American Bank, the debtor induced American
Bank of Martin County to issue a letter of credit in favor of one of the debtor's equipment
lessors within six weeks before debtor's Chapter 11 filing. Id. at 295.
75. 123 B.R. 104 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.), vacated, 134 B.R. 445 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990) (sup-
plemental opinion), rev'd, 130 B.R. 610 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
76. Id at 105.
77. Id at 107.
78. Id at 111. The court applied the injunction test and concluded that Prime Motor Inns
would most likely succeed on the merits because its default would not be valid under the ipso
facto prohibition. The court gave little weight to the fact that the debtor was not a party to the
Trust Indenture. Id. at 108.
79. Id. at 110-11.
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feat the intended purpose of letters of credit: to shift the risk from the
beneficiaries-bondholders-to the issuers-banks.80
IV. A PROPOSED POLICY FOR TREATMENT OF LETTERS OF CREDIT
IN BANKRUPTCY
A. Prohibition of Ipso Facto Clauses
A typical standby letter of credit is payable upon the beneficiary's
certification to the issuer that the account party has defaulted in some
obligation running from the account party to the beneficiary.81 Often,
the agreement obligating the account party to the beneficiary will provide
that the account party's bankruptcy is an event of default.82 This scena-
rio, under which the account party/debtor's bankruptcy filing triggers
the draw on the letter of credit, leads some debtors to argue that the
draw violates the Code's invalidation of ipso facto clauses.8" Section
365(e)(1) of the Code invalidates ipso facto clauses; that is, it prohibits
the termination or modification of an executory contract of the debtor
solely because of the commencement of a bankruptcy case.84 In addition,
the Code prohibits forfeiture of property of the estate merely because of a
bankruptcy fling. 5 Since the Code provides no definition of "executory
contract, ' 86 courts have grappled with the issue of whether a bankruptcy
default should trigger payment of a letter of credit.87 Draws on letters of
credit should be specifically exempted from § 365(e)(1) for the following
reasons: the letter of credit is not a contract of the debtor; the reimburse-
ment agreement, providing for the letter of credit, falls within the "finan-
cial accommodation" exception to § 365(e);88 and, for purposes of
§ 365(e), letters of credit should be treated like guarantees and surety
bonds, both of which can be enforced following a debtor's bankruptcy.
89
80. Id. at 104.
81. See U.C.C. § 5-114 (1990). For a discussion of issuer's duty to pay, see DOLAN, supra
note 4, 7.02.
82. See, e.g., Prime Motor Inns, 123 B.R. at 107.
83. See id. at 104; Zenith Labs. v. Security Pac. Natl Trust Co. (In re Zenith Labs., Inc.),
104 B.R. 667 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989).
84. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (1988).
85. Id. § 541(c) (1988).
86. The legislative history to the Code gives some guidance, stating that the term includes
contracts in which performance remains due to some extent on both sides. H.R. REP. No.
595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 347 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6303-04.
87. See Prime Motor Inns, 123 B.R. at 108; Zenith Labs, 104 B.R. at 672.
88. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2)(B) (1988).
89. Wegner Farms Co. v. Merchants Bonding Co. (In re Wegner Farms Co.), 49 B.R. 440
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985); Fintel v. Oregon (In re Fintel), 10 B.R. 50 (Bankr. D. Or. 1981);
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Courts confronted with the anti-ipso facto argument in letter of
credit cases are faced with a web of three contracts that make up a letter
of credit transaction: (1) the underlying contract between the account
party and the beneficiary; (2) the letter of credit obligation running from
the issuer to the beneficiary; and (3) the reimbursement obligation of the
account party to the issuer. Does § 365 apply to the letter of credit?
Does it apply to the reimbursement agreement? Or, does § 365 apply to
the underlying contract? The answer to the first two questions is a re-
sounding "No!" A letter of credit is not a contract of the debtor. It is an
obligation of an issuer to a beneficiary obligating the issuer to pay the
beneficiary out of the issuer's own funds upon the occurrence of certain
conditions. Therefore, § 365(e)'s prohibition against the termination of
an executory contract of the debtor based solely upon the debtor's bank-
ruptcy filing does not apply. In addition, since neither the letter of credit
nor its proceeds are property of the debtor's estate, § 541(c), prohibiting
forfeiture of estate property, does not apply.90
A reading of the plain language of the Code shows why the ipso
facto prohibition should not apply to the reimbursement agreement.
Furthermore, an exception to the ipso facto prohibition allows modifica-
tion or termination of a contract to "make a loan, or extend other debt
financing or financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the
debtor," even if that contract is executory.9' Such contracts are ex-
empted from § 365(e)(1) because a trustee is not permitted to assume an
executory contract to make a loan to or for the benefit of the debtor, or to
issue a security of the debtor.92 The legislative history of the Code also
indicates that a trustee cannot assume letters of credit.
93
The legislative history of the Code gives some insight into the prohi-
bition of ipso facto clauses and why this prohibition does not apply to
agreements to make a loan. The operation of such a clause in nonloan
situations will frequently hamper a debtor's reorganization efforts: for
Governmental Nat'l Mortgage Corp. v. Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (In re Adana Mort-
gage Bankers, Inc.), 12 B.R. 977 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
90. Page Assocs. v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Page), 18 B.R. 713, 717 (D.D.C. 1982).
91. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2)(B).
92. Id. § 365(c)(2) (1988). But see In re Texaco, where a Trust Indenture was considered
executory because the debtor, in addition to paying the notes, was also obligated to maintain
an office where the notes could be presented for payment, maintain a current list of security
holders, and replace lost, mutilated, or destroyed securities. 73 B.R. 960, 964 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1987). The Indenture Trustee was obligated to commence litigation under the in-
denture, file proofs of claim, give notice of default, and submit reports to noteholders. Id.
93. H.R. RFP. No. 595, supra note 86, at 347, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6304.
There is nothing in the legislative history, however, to indicate whether the trustee is standing
in the shoes of the account party, the issuer, or the beneficiary.
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example, if a supply contract were to terminate upon the debtor's bank-
ruptcy.14 However, a bankruptcy filing accelerates all of a debtor's debts.
Therefore, a contract to make a loan to or for the benefit of the debtor
cannot be utilized to assist in a debtor's reorganization or liquidation.9"
This "financial accommodation" exception to the ipso facto prohibi-
tion has been held to apply only to agreements to provide future credit.96
The reimbursement agreement, under which the issuer gives the letter of
credit, is an agreement to provide credit for the benefit of an account
party upon the presentation of specified documents and is therefore an
agreement to provide future credit for the benefit of the debtor.97 The
trustee in bankruptcy cannot assume or reject this contract on the
grounds that it is a loan contract. Therefore, the ipso facto prohibition in
§ 365 of the Code should be inapplicable to agreements to provide a let-
ter of credit.
The question involving whether the underlying contract default
should be subject to the anti-ipso facto provision is far more complicated.
Parties seeking to enjoin payment of letters of credit will sometimes ar-
gue that the underlying contract default precipitating the draw was void
because of the ipso facto prohibition.98 Courts have yet to articulate a
clear answer to this argument. In the cases involving public finance
transactions, when the account party's bankruptcy filing triggers a draw
on a letter of credit, the courts have addressed the ipso facto argument by
holding that since the underlying contract is not a contract of the debtor,
the underlying contract is not subject to § 365(e).99 Unfortunately, this
reasoning applies only to public finance transactions.
94. IdL
95. Such an assumption is prohibited by 11 U.S.C. § 365 (c)(2).
96. Peninsula Int'l Corp. v. Citizens & Southern Int'l Bank (In re Peninsula Int'l Corp.),
19 B.R. 762, 764 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (holding bankruptcy default invalid in agreement
extending debtor's time to pay previous debt).
97. For an example of a reimbursement agreement, also known as an application agree-
ment, see DOLAN, supra note 4, §§ A-75 to A-83.
98. Prime Motor Inns, Inc. v. First Fidelity Bank N.A. N.J. (In re Prime Motor Inns,
Inc.), 123 B.R. 104 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.), vacated, 134 B.R. 445 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990) (supple-
mental opinion), rev'd, 130 B.R. 610 (S.D. Fla. 1991); Zenith Labs. v. Security Pac. Nat'l
Trust Co. (In re Zenith Labs., Inc.), 104 B.R. 667 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989). In Diamond
Machine Co. v. Casco Northern Bank (In re Diamond Machine Co.), 95 B.R. 255, 257 (Bankr.
D. Me. 1988), the debtor pointed out that its only default under its bond financing documents
was a bankruptcy filing and further claimed that all of its payments were current. However, in
requesting an injunction against payment of a letter of credit, the debtor did not ask the court
to declare its default void under § 365(e). Id.
99. Prime Motor Inns, Inc. v. First Fidelity Bank N.A. N.J. (In re Prime Motors Inns,
Inc.), 130 B.R. 610, 613 (S.D. Fla. 1991); Zenith Labs, 104 B.R. at 672.
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In public finance transactions, the debtor is not a party to the trust
indenture, because the bonds are obligations of public authorities."°
Typically, the debtor's bankruptcy filing will constitute an event of de-
fault under the trust indenture, entitling the trustee to draw upon the
credit to pay the bonds. Courts therefore have found that no "contract
of the debtor" was involved, and therefore that the draws did not violate
the Code's prohibition of ipso facto clauses.101
Courts have applied the foregoing reasoning to deny injunctions in
cases such as Zenith Laboratories v. Security Pacific National Trust Co.
(In re Zenith Laboratories, Inc.) 1 2 and Prime Motor Inns v. First Fidelity
Bank N.A. N.J. (In re Prime Motor Inns, Inc.). 3 Both cases dealt with
public financing arrangements under which the default that triggered the
draw arose under a trust indenture to which the debtor was not a party.
In Zenith Laboratories the debtor's bankruptcy constituted a default
under a financing agreement between the debtor and the the New Jersey
Economic Development Authority (EDA). The default, in turn, consti-
tuted a default under the trust indenture. The debtor's obligations under
its financing agreements with the EDA were assigned to the indenture
trustee,"° as is typical in such arrangements. Therefore, it may be a
stretch to reason, as the Prime Motor Inns and Zenith Laboratories
courts did, that the ipso facto prohibition does not apply because the
trust indenture is not a contract of the debtor. In addition, although
such reasoning works in public finance cases, it does not provide a consis-
tent policy for application in all letter of credit cases, as for instance,
those in which the debtor is a party to the underlying agreement.105
It is useful to look at cases involving guarantees and surety bonds to
illustrate why § 365, applied to the underlying contract between the ac-
count party and the beneficiary, should not operate to support injunc-
tions against payment of letters of credit. It is well-settled that a
100. In the typical municipal bond transaction, the public authority makes a loan of the
bond proceeds to a developer who is the principal obligor. The developer obtains a letter of
credit to guarantee repayment of the bonds.
101. Prime Motor Inns, 130 B.R. at 613; Zenith Labs., 104 B.R. at 672. Zenith Labs. was
argued under the Code's automatic stay provision. Its facts are similar to those in Prime
Motor Inns.
102. 104 B.R. at 667.
103. 123 B.R. 104 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.), vacated, 134 B.R. 445 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990) (sup-
plemental opinion), rev'd, 130 B.R. 610 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
104. Zenith Labs., 104 B.R. at 672.
105. Wysko Inv. Co. v. Great Am. Bank, 131 B.R. 146 (D. Ariz. 1991) (involving debtor
who entered into agreement to purchase apartment complex and obtained letter of credit to
secure its obligation thereunder); In re Delaware River Stevedores, Inc., 129 B.R. 38 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1991) (involving letter of credit issued to secure debtor's obligations under agreement
with U.S. Department of Labor).
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guarantee is a contract to make a financial accommodation for the benefit
of the debtor.10 6 Courts have recognized that although surety bonds are
not the same as loan agreements, such bonds do obligate sureties to per-
form the debtor's financial obligations in the event that a debtor does not
or cannot pay. As such, courts have held that surety bonds are financial
accommodations for the purpose of § 365 of the Code.
107
A standby letter of credit performs the same function as a guarantee
or surety bond, with the added benefit of prompt payment afforded by
the independence principle. A letter of credit issuer is obligated to pay
the beneficiary if the account party cannot or does not pay on its obliga-
tion to the beneficiary. The point is well-settled that a creditor may pro-
ceed against a guarantor or surety of the debtor if the debtor fails to
perform its obligations for any reason, including bankruptcy. 08 Thus, it
would be senseless to allow debtors to successfully argue that draws on
letters of credit are prohibited by § 365(e) of the Code, while courts allow
payments on guarantees and surety bonds.
An analysis of the Wysko Investment Co. v. Great American Bank 109
and In re Delaware River Stevedores, Inc. "0 cases shows why the applica-
tion of § 365(e)(1) to agreements to provide letters of credit defeats the
purpose of letters of credit. In Wysko, the court enjoined payment on the
letter of credit and allowed the debtor to substitute a certificate of deposit
for the letter of credit."1 The beneficiary, upon such substitution, lost its
bargained-for protection, because any action by the beneficiary to obtain
the proceeds of the certificate of deposit upon default by the account
party-debtor would be subject to the automatic stay as an action to en-
force a lien against property of the debtor.112
In Delaware River Stevedores the court did not need to address the
ipso facto argument because the beneficiary claimed that it was the
debtor's failure to make its worker's compensation payments-not the
106. Governmental Natl Mortgage Corp. v. Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (In re Adana
Mortgage Bankers, Inc.), 12 B.R. 977 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (allowing GNMA to terminate
its guarantee of mortgage banker's obligations under GNMA's mortgage-backed securities
program upon mortgage banker's bankruptcy filing).
107. Wegner Farms Co. v. Merchants Bonding Co. (In re Wegner Farms Co.), 49 B.R. 440
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985).
108. Fintel v. Oregon (In re Fintel), 10 B.R. 50, 52"(Bankr. D. Or. 1981) (involving surety
bond); see also In re Larmar Estates, Inc., 5 B.R. 328 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980) (involving
guarantee).
109. 131 B.R. at 146.
110. 129 B.R. at 38.
111. Wysko, 131 B.R. at 146.
112. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) (1988).
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debtor's bankruptcy-that led to the draw.1 13 The question thus arose
whether the debtor could make the required payments while its bank-
ruptcy case was pending.' 14 The court allowed the injunction pending a
determination of whether the debtor could make the payments.'" The
court thus defeated a prime goal of letters of credit, that of prompt pay-
ment. Even if bankruptcy were the only default, the Department of La-
bor bargained for prompt payment upon the debtor's bankruptcy. The
court would not be able to provide an equal assurance of payment.
When ipso facto clauses are unenforceable, courts must be sensitive
to the rights of the nondebtor party to the contract or lease. If the
trustee in bankruptcy assumes a contract, the court must ensure that the
trustee's performance under the contract will give the other contracting
party the full benefit of its bargain." 6 In the letter of credit context, the
only way to give the beneficiary the benefit of its bargain is to recognize
the shift of risk from the beneficiary to the issuer and to enforce the letter
of credit.
The foregoing analysis shows a need to clarify the financial accom-
modation exception to § 365(e) of the Code. One way to provide a con-
sistent policy for dealing with the ipso facto argument in letter of credit
cases would be to provide an express exemption for letters of credit
within § 365(e). Standby letters of credit are agreements to provide fu-
ture credit for the benefit of an account party. It would be useful, there-
fore, to define "financial accommodation" to include letters of credit
issued for the account of the debtor.
B. Injunction Test
Once the ipso facto argument is disposed of, an alternative argument
can be made that the letter of credit should be enjoined because an in-
junction is necessary for the debtor's reorganization. 17 Such an argu-
ment necessitates an analysis of the four-prong test for injunctive relief.
The UCC contemplates injunctions of letters of credit only in the
event that a required document is forged or fraudulent or if there is fraud
113. Delaware River Stevedores, 129 B.R. at 42.
114. Id.
115. Id at 44.
116. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 86, at 347, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6304-05.
If the trustee assumes an executory contract or lease of the debtor, the trustee must "provide[ ]
adequate assurance of future performance under such contract or lease." 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(b)(1)(C) (1988).
117. Wysko Inv. Co. v. Great Am. Bank, 131 B.R. 146, 147 (D. Ariz. 1991); Page Assocs.
v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Page), 18 B.R. 713, 717 (D.D.C. 1982); Twist Cap, Inc. v. Southeast
Bank (In re Twist Cap, Inc.), 1 B.R. 284, 285 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1979).
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in the transaction."1 ' Thus, if the UCC were the sole source of law there
would be no injunctions issued merely on account of a party's bank-
ruptcy. However, problems arise from the overlap of bankruptcy law.
Courts have considered enjoining payment on letters in bankruptcy
cases, using the same theory that they use in cases involving stays against
other codebtors, such as insurance companies1 9 and guarantors: 120 The
payment of the letter of credit would have a negative impact on the
debtor's reorganization efforts. The analysis that follows shows that,
although an injunction against some codebtors may be appropriate in
bankruptcy cases, injunctions against letters of credit are not
appropriate.
In determining whether to enjoin actions against a nondebtor under
§ 105 of the Code,"' courts have considered the following four factors:
(1) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is
not granted; (2) whether such injury outweighs the harm that granting
injunctive relief would inflict on the defendant; (3) whether the plaintiff
has exhibited a likelihood of success on the merits; and (4) whether the
public interest will be served by granting the injunction.1 22 The follow-
ing analysis shows that when courts consider these four factors in letter
of credit cases, they should never find it permissible to enjoin letters of
credit in bankruptcy.
1. Irreparable injury
In bankruptcy proceedings, courts have construed the irreparable
injury requirement to mean that there is a danger of imminent, irrepara-
ble harm to the estate or the debtor's ability to reorganize.1 23 In actions
involving letters of credit, debtors have argued that the estate will suffer
118. U.C.C. § 5-114(2) (1989).
119. Oberg v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 828 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 969 (1988).
120. Lahman Mfg. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Lahman Mfg. Co.), 33 B.R. 681 (Bankr.
D.S.D. 1983).
121. The automatic stay provisions in § 362 are limited to actions against debtors. See
generally Barry L. Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
213 (1988) (analyzing how courts have stayed actions against codebtors despite absence of
explicit codebtor stay in Chapter 11).
122. Diamond Mach. Co. v. Casco N. Bank (In re Diamond Mach. Co.), 95 B.R. 255
(Bankr. D. Me. 1988); see also cases cited supra note 20.
123. In re Monroe Well Serv., Inc., 67 B.R. 746, 754 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.), modified and affid,
69 B.R. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
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irreparable harm as a result of the high rate of interest payable on the
reimbursement agreement. 124
Courts have held that there is the possibility of irreparable harm to a
debtor's estate when the failure to grant the requested injunction would
cause the debtor's business to cease operating.1 21 In In re Monroe Well
Service, Inc., the debtor asked the court to enjoin creditors with material-
men's liens from enforcing those liens against property that was not
property of the debtor's estate. 26 If the creditors were permitted to en-
force their liens, the owners of the working interests in the oil wells
would cease making monthly service payments to the debtor.1 27 The
debtor would thus cease servicing the wells, and the wells would cease
being operational within thirty to ninety days.' 28 The court recognized
that the failure to grant an injunction would deprive the debtor of all of
its operating income and would destroy any prospects for reorganiza-
tion.1 29 The court granted the injunction, noting that the failure to do so
would cause irreparable harm to the debtor. In contrast, payment on a
letter of credit would not stop a debtor's business, because any action by
the issuer against the debtor would be subject to the automatic stay and
the debtor would not be deprived of operating income.
Courts have also found irreparable harm where the continuation of
actions against a party liable with the debtor would interfere with the
efforts of the debtor's officers, directors, and employees to formulate and
effect the plan of reorganization. Oberg v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
(In re A.H. Robins Co.), 130 a case arising out of the A.H. Robins Co.
bankruptcy, is the type of case where the failure to enjoin actions against
a third party would result in unusual harm to the debtor's ability to reor-
ganize. The court found such irreparable harm when over 4000 plaintiffs
wished to sue Aetna, the debtor's insurer, for injuries resulting from the
use of the Dalkon Shield. 31 The court's holding was based on the fact
that Aetna's defense would be that Robins, not Aetna, was responsible
124. In re Delaware River Stevedores, Inc., 129 B.R. 38 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991); Prime
Motor Inns, Inc. v. First Fidelity Bank N.A. N.J. (In re Prime Motor Inns, Inc.), 123 B.R. 104
(Bankr. S.D. Fla.), vacated, 134 B.R. 445 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990) (supplemental opinion),
rev'd, 130 B.R. 610 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
125. Monroe Well Serv., 67 B.R. at 746.
126. Id at 748.
127. Id at 749.
128. Id
129. Id at 750.
130. Oberg v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 828 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 969 (1988).
131. Id at 1025.
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for the plaintiffs' injuries.' 3 2 If this were the case, Robins's officers, di-
rectors, and employees would be drawn into a massive lawsuit, which
would demand a great deal of their time and interfere with Robins's reor-
ganization.133 However, in another case, the court held that officers and
employees of a debtor will be required to testify in only two actions
against the debtor's surety absent an injunction, the harm to the debtor's
estate was not irreparable.' 34 There is no comparable harm in the letter
of credit context, because payment on the credit is immediate upon pres-
entation of the required documents.
In cases where a solvent guarantor is the only source of reorganiza-
tion funds and a continued action against the guarantor would deplete
this source of funds,135 or where a continued action against a third party
could result in undue pressure on the debtor, courts have also found ir-
reparable harm to the debtor's ability to reorganize.136 The court in First
Federal Savings & Loan v. Pettit 13 7 enjoined a home mortgagee's action
against nonbankrupt codebtors where the nonbankrupt codebtors were
the debtor's parents. The court found that the failure to enjoin such an
action, where the third party was a close relative of the debtor, might
place undue pressure on the bankrupt and ultimately affect the proposed
reorganization. 3 ' Neither of the above two situations applies to letters
of credit: the first because the issuer's funds would not be available for
the debtor's reorganization, and the second because it is unlikely that an
issuer could place undue influence on the debtor.
Debtors have, however, claimed irreparable injury arising from the
higher rate of interest payable on the reimbursement agreement. The
132. Id. at 1025-26.
133. Id
134. Dore & Assocs. Contracting, Inc. v. American Druggists' Ins. Co. (In re Dore & As-
socs. Contracting, Inc.), 54 B.R. 353, 361 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985). In Dore, the city of
Wausau, Wisconsin successfully lifted a preliminary injunction enjoining Wausau from suing
on a surety bond issued for the debtor in connection with a construction project. Id. The
court also found that the additional legal costs incurred by the debtor would not constitute
irreparable harm, nor would the fact that the surety would be subrogated to Wausau's claim
against the debtor's bankruptcy estate. Id. at 361-62.
135. Lahman Mfg. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Lahman Mfg. Co.), 33 B.R. 681 (Bankr.
D.S.D. 1983). In Lahman, the guarantor-president wanted to use debtor-owned real estate as
collateral to finance debtor's reorganization effort. Id. at 683. The court found irreparable
harm because an action against the guarantor would deplete this source of financing. Id.
136. First Fed. Say. & Loan v. Pettit, 510 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Ark. 1981).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 228.
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bankruptcy court in Prime Motor Inns 139 enjoined payment on several
letters of credit, finding, in part, the possibility of irreparable harm to the
debtor because of the high rate of interest that the debtor would be re-
quired to pay under its reimbursement agreement.' 4° The district court,
in reversing the bankruptcy court, did not address whether payment of a
higher rate of interest could constitute irreparable harm. 41 In Delaware
River Stevedores, the court declined to hold that a higher rate of interest
would, in itself, cause irreparable harm to the debtor's estate. The debtor
gave the letter of credit as security for the debtor's participation as a self-
insurer in the United States Department of Labor's Workmen's Compen-
sation Program.14 2 Upon the debtor's bankruptcy filing and failure to
pay its insurance obligations, the Department of Labor attempted to
draw on the letter. 143 The reimbursement agreement between the debtor
and the issuer called for an interest rate of 11.25%.144 In arguing that
this higher interest rate would result in irreparable injury to the debtor,
the debtor's chief executive officer testified that the additional debt-at
the higher interest rate-would be a forty percent increase in the debtor's
trade debt.1 45 The court suggested that the debtor make a motion to pay
its obligations directly during the course of the bankruptcy case, and ex-
tended the stay pending resolution of such a motion.1 46 The court did
not rule on whether paying a high rate of interest could constitute irrepa-
rable harm.
A high rate of interest payable on the reimbursement agreement
should not be considered irreparable harm to the debtor. Under the
Code, a secured creditor is entitled to postpetition interest on its claim.1
4 7
Therefore, if the reimbursement agreement between an account party
and its issuer is secured, the issuer should be entitled to the interest pro-
vided for under the reimbursement agreement, up to the value of the
collateral securing the reimbursement agreement. The interest rate on
139. Prime Motor Inns, Inc. v. First Fidelity Bank N.A. N.J. (In re Prime Motor Inns,
Inc.), 123 B.R. 104 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.), vacated, 134 B.R. 445 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990) (supple-
mental opinion), rev'd, 130 B.R. 610 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
140. Id. at 106. The difference between the interest rate on the bonds and the interest rate
on the letters of credit amounted to $742,000 per year. Id
141. See Prime Motor Inns, Inc. v. First Fidelity Bank N.A. N.J. (In re Prime Motor Inns,
Inc.), 130 B.R. 610 (S.D. Fla. 1991). The court based its holding primarily on the fact that it
did not believe that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the matter.
142. In re Delaware River Stevedores, Inc., 129 B.R. 38, 39 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 40.
145. Id.
146. Id at 44. The debtor's good faith was in question, as it admitted that it filed a Chapter
11 petition in part to avoid its payments to the Department of Labor. Id.
147. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988).
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the reimbursement agreement, however, is usually higher than the inter-
est rate on the original obligation owed by the debtor-account party to
the beneficiary. Courts have held that a creditor can be, but is not al-
ways, entitled to a higher, or "default," rate of interest after a bank-
ruptcy filing.148 Consequently, some courts have allowed creditors a
postpetition interest rate as high as 38.53%,149 while others have disal-
lowed a twenty-five percent postpetition interest rate as a penalty. 50
A higher rate of interest does not per se constitute irreparable harm
to the debtor's ability to reorganize. Courts will uphold a bargained-for,
contractual default rate of interest unless equitable considerations de-
mand otherwise."5 Courts evaluate the allowability of default rates of
interest on a case-by-case basis. Courts tend to allow such rates if the
debtor had an opportunity to bargain over the default rate, 52 the rate is
an industry standard, 53 and the creditor is oversecured.154 Debtors have
the right to bargain for the default rate of interest payable on the reim-
bursement agreement-on the underlying contract with the beneficiary, a
debtor could bargain to provide security other than a letter of credit, thus
obviating the need for a reimbursement agreement. Since such a default
rate would only be payable to an oversecured issuer up to the value of its
security, it is difficult to see the harm to the debtor's estate as irreparable:
A secured letter of credit issuer would be treated like any other secured
creditor.
Irreparable harm in the letter of credit context is unlikely.
Although the interest rate on the reimbursement agreement will, b6
higher than the interest rate on the underlying loan, higher default rates
of interest are permissible in bankruptcy. The debtor will not be subject
to any additional actions during the bankruptcy case because the issuing
bank's actions against the account party will be stayed until the case is
closed. Additionally, it is not likely that a bank could impose undue
pressure on a debtor in the way that an insider or family member could.
148. Compare In re Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. 500 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987) (enforcing 14.75%
default rate of interest) with In re W.S. Sheppley & Co., 62 B.R. 271 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986)
(declining to enforce 12% default rate of interest because creditor's risk of nonpayment was
small and since Chapter 11 plan provided for orderly liquidation).
149. In re Whatley, 134 B.R. 561 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1991).
150. In re DWS Invs., Inc., 121 B.R. 845 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990).
151. Id at 849.
152. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaumburg Hotel Owners Ltd. Partnership (In re
Schaumburg Hotel Owners Ltd. Partnership), 97 B.R. 943, 951 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989); Skyler
Ridge, 80 B.R. at 511.
153. DWSInv&, 121 B.R. at 849.
154. W.S. Sheppley & Co., 62 B.R. at 278.
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2. Balancing of harms
After evaluating the injury to the debtor and the debtor's estate,
courts must balance that injury against the injury to other creditors if the
injunction is granted. In the letter of credit context, the harm to the
debtor that will arise from the issuer's payment on the letter of credit will
be the high rate of interest the debtor will have to pay to the issuing
bank.'55 Although a high rate of interest will deplete the debtor's estate,
reducing payment to unsecured creditors, the Code specifically allows
postpetition interest. Default rates of interest are allowable in bank-
ruptcy.'- 6 The harm to the account party would be prevented by the
automatic stay. In addition, postpetition interest is only allowed to se-
cured creditors; thus, in all likelihood, the issuer of an unsecured letter of
credit would not be able to collect the higher rate of interest.15 7 A se-
cured issuer could only collect interest at the default rate up to the value
of its collateral; therefore, the harm to other creditors as a result of the
draw would probably not be serious.
The creditor-beneficiary, however, loses the benefit of its bargain. In
Dore & Associates Contracting, Inc. v. American Druggests' Insurance Co.
(In re Dore & Associates Contracting, Inc. ),158 a case in which the debtor
attempted to enjoin payment on a surety bond, the court found that the
injury to the city-with whom the debtor had entered into a site develop-
ment contract-as a result of being enjoined from exercising its bar-
gained-for right to sue on a surety bond, far outweighed the possible
injury to the debtor from allowing the suit.'59 Many lenders will not
lend without a letter of credit guaranteeing the borrower's indebtedness.
Consequently, lenders commonly bargain for the right to draw on a letter
of credit if the borrowers fail to perform. The risk of the borrower's
bankruptcy is one of the risks that the lender is seeking to avoid.
In the municipal bond context, the losers are the general public,
who are the bondholders. The bondholders are deprived of the bargain
they made when they bought the bonds-that the credit of a bank would
stand behind the credit of a municipality."
155. The debtor will have to pay this rate for all prepetition interest, and for postpetition
interest if the bank's reimbursement is oversecured. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988); see United
States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
156. See supra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
157. 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(b)(2), 506(b) (1988).
158. Dore & Assocs. Contracting, Inc. v. American Druggists' Ins. Co. (In re Dore & As-
socs. Contracting, Inc.), 54 B.R. 353 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985).
159. Id.
160. See Prime Motor Inns, Inc. v. First Fidelity Bank N.A. N.J. (In re Prime Motor Inns,
Inc.), 130 B.R. 610, 614 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
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3. Likelihood of success on the merits
Generally, likelihood of success on the merits of the case is a prereq-
uisite to a preliminary injunction. In cases where courts have been asked
to issue a § 105 injunction, the courts have held that the debtor has a
likelihood of success on the merits when there is a reasonable likelihood
of a successful reorganization. 161 In Monroe Well Service 162 the court
found that this requirement was satisfied when the debtor had submitted
its plan of reorganization and where all interested parties believed that
there was a reasonable possibility of reorganization. 163 On the other
hand, in Otero Mills, Inc. v. Security Bank & Trust (In re Otero Mills,
Inc.), the debtor's plan was not yet due at the time the injunction was
requested; therefore, the probability of a successful reorganization was
speculative. 164 The court held that debtors are entitled to present a plan
and thus enjoined an action against a guarantor until either the debtor
failed to file a plan or its plan was not approved.
165
It seems that the probability of success on the merits cannot be de-
termined without evaluating the seriousness of the harm arising from
failure to grant an injunction. If the harm as a result of failure to enjoin
is serious enough to impede the debtor's reorganization, then the court
will likely favor reorganization, unless the public interest far outweighs
the purpose served by granting an injunction. As this Article illus-
trates, 166 a great deal of public interest weighs in favor of upholding let-
ters of credit.
4. The public interest
The fourth factor that courts look to in deciding whether or not to
grant an injunction under § 105 is whether the public interest will be
served by granting the injunction. Courts must weigh a prime goal of
bankruptcy-preserving and protecting the assets of a debtor so that they
may be distributed in time to all creditors without unfair preference167_
161. In re Monroe Well Serv., Inc., 67 B.R. 746, 752 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.), modified and affid,
69 B.R. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Dore, 54 B.R. at 358; Lahman Mfg. Co. v. First Natl Bank (In re
Lahman Mfg. Co.), 33 B.R. 681, 684-85 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1983); Otero Mills, Inc. v. Security
Bank & Trust (In re Otero Mills, Inc.), 21 B.R. 777, 779 (Bankr. D.N.M.), affid, 25 B.R. 1018
(D.N.M. 1982).
162. 67 B.R. at 746.
163. Id at 755.
164. Otero Mills, 21 B.R. at 779.
165. Id.
166. See supra part II.
167. Penn Terra, Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 269 (3d Cir. 1984).
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against competing societal interests. 161 In the letter of credit context, the
debtor will often argue that payment on the letter of credit will impede
the debtor's reorganization by depleting assets of the estate. 169 There-
fore, when deciding whether or not to enjoin payment of letters of credit,
courts must weigh the goal of preserving the debtor's assets against the
goal of upholding letters of credit as a unique commercial financing
device.
In proceedings involving payment obligations that did not fall
strictly into protected Code sections, the courts have held state environ-
mental policies17 ° and state criminal laws 17 1 to be paramount to federal
bankruptcy policy. Courts have held that environmental policies may
supersede the Bankruptcy Code because of each state's strong interest in
safeguarding the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. 172 They have
also held that states should be able to fashion criminal penalties without
interference from the Bankruptcy Code.1
73
Established state policies, such as those regarding crimes and the
environment, are not the only policies to which the Code must yield.
Courts have construed the term "public interest" in a variety of ways. In
Lahman Manufacturing Co. v. First National Bank (In re Lahman Mfg.
168. Certain conflicts between bankruptcy law and other societal interests are broadly re-
solved in the Code itself. The automatic stay provisions do not apply to the commencement or
continuation of criminal actions against the debtor, to the collection of alimony, maintenance,
or support from the debtor's property, or to actions to enforce a state's police power. 11 U.S.C
§ 362(b) (1988). In addition, the Code excepts from discharge certain tax obligations, criminal
penalties, alimony payments, student loan obligations, and debts arising from drunk driving
accidents. IL § 523 (1988).
169. See Prime Motors Inns, Inc. v. First Fidelity Bank N.A. N.J. (In re Prime Motors
Inns, Inc.), 123 B.R. 104 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.), vacated, 134 B.R. 445 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990)
(supplemental opinion), rev'd, 130 B.R. 610 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
170. See, eg., Penn Terra, 733 F.2d 267.
171. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
172. In Penn Terra, a coal mining corporation filed a petition under Chapter 7 of the Code
while it was under a state court order to correct violations of state environmental protection
statutes. The Department of Environmental Resources argued that enforcement of the
debtor's obligations was exempted from the stay as an exercise of the state's police power
under § 362(b)(4). Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 270. The debtor, Penn Terra, argued that enforc-
ing its cleanup obligations would be a violation of the automatic stay as an enforcement of a
money judgment under § 362(b)(5), and thus asked the court to interpret the term "money
judgment" to include enforcement of a mandatory injunction requiring the debtor to spend
money. Id at 270-72.
173. In Kelly, the debtor, prior to filing her Chapter 7 petition, had pled guilty to larceny,
and, as part of her sentence, was required to make restitution to the Connecticut Department
of Adult Probation. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 38-39. The bankruptcy court granted the debtor a
discharge. Id at 39. This decision was reversed by the district court and reversed again by the
Second Circuit. Id at 42-43. The Supreme Court was thus faced with the question of whether
this kind of a debt was dischargeable in bankruptcy. Id at 38.
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Co.),174 the debtor was a farm implements manufacturer in a town with a
population of 450.175 The debtor was the largest employer in town.176
The court found, therefore, that the public interest weighed in favor of
the debtor's reorganization, and thus enjoined an action against the
debtor's guarantor. 177
Of course, bankruptcy interferes with the expectations of creditors.
An unsecured creditor is stayed, by § 362 of the Code, from exercising its
rights against a borrower in bankruptcy.1 78 A secured creditor is stayed
from foreclosing on its collateral. 179 Sometimes, a creditor is enjoined
from proceeding against a guarantor.18 0 However, a creditor can miti-
gate the harsh results of a debtor's bankruptcy. For instance, creditors
can take steps to assure that they receive a greater payment in bank-
ruptcy by obtaining collateral." 1 Therefore, it is necessary to decide
whether letters of credit are so important to the public interest that credi-
tors should be able to use them to avoid the effects of a debtor's
bankruptcy.
The public interest in upholding unique commercial devices has
been held paramount in bankruptcy proceedings involving surety bonds.
Courts have been asked to enjoin surety bonds in bankruptcy proceed-
ings under the automatic stay provision of the Code, § 362,182 and under
§ 105.183 Like letters of credit, surety bonds do not become part of a
debtor's estate.184 The purpose of obtaining a surety bond is similar to
the purpose of obtaining a letter of credit: the protection of intended
beneficiaries if the primary obligor fails to perform for any reason, in-
eluding bankruptcy. 185 In Dore, 18 6 the court weighed the interest in pro-
moting successful reorganizations against the public interest in
protecting the integrity of construction performance bonds.1 87 The court
174. 33 B.R. 681 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1983).
175. Id. at 685.
176. Id
177. Id at 681.
178. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1988).
179. Id § 362(a)(4) (1988).
180. Lahman, 33 B.R. at 681.
181. Creditors receive the full amount of their secured claims in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C.
§ 506 (1988). See generally BENJAMIN WEINTRAUB & ALAN N. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY
LAW MANUAL 5.14 (rev. ed. 1986).
182. Fintel v. Oregon (In re Fintel), 10 B.R. 50 (Bankr. D. Or. 1981).
183. Dore & Assocs. Contracting, Inc. v. American Druggists' Ins. Co. (In re Dore & As-
socs. Contracting, Inc.), 54 B.R. 353 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985).
184. Fintel, 10 B.R. at 51.
185. Id at 52.
186. 54 B.R. 353.
187. Id. at 353.
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was not convinced that a reorganization was less likely to occur if the
surety suit were allowed to proceed. 8 8 On the other hand, the harm to
the public interest in the commercial integrity of performance bonds was
considerable because Wausau, the beneficiary of the performance bond,
was enjoined from suing on the bonds for three years. 18 9 The court
claimed that such an injunction undermined the integrity of construction
bonds in general. 9
To evaluate the public policy behind upholding letters of credit, it is
necessary to revisit the independence principle. The beneficiary of a let-
ter of credit requests the letter in order "to make certain that, if the other
party to the contract defaults, the beneficiary can gain access to a secure
fund of money which he can use, say, to satisfy the other party's debt to
him... or to... substitute performance." '  A beneficiary, in obtaining
a letter of credit, does so to make certain that any dispute on the underly-
ing contract will "wend [its] way towards resolution with the money in
the beneficiary's pocket rather than in the pocket of the [beneficiary's
adversary]." '192 The beneficiary, by bargaining for a letter of credit in-
stead of a guaranty or other security device-enforcement of which may,
in the case of a guaranty, or would, in the case of other security, be
stayed by operation of the automatic stay or by application of § 105-
should be able to avoid the consequences of the debtor's bankruptcy.
Even in fraud cases the courts uphold the independence of letters of
credit unless the wrongdoing of the beneficiary has "so vitiated the entire
transaction that the legitimate purposes of the independence of the is-
suer's obligation would no longer be served." 193 Thus, courts have up-
held payment when the documents have some basis in fact, 194 but have
enjoined payment when the beneficiary has no bona fide claim to pay-
ment, as in a commercial letter of credit when the beneficiary ships
worthless material intended to simulate actual merchandise. 195
There are additional strong policy reasons for upholding letters of
credit in the face of an account party's bankruptcy. Letters of credit are
often issued in connection with public bond financing. Industrial devel-
opment bonds and economic development bonds are issued to finance
projects in the public interest. The various state-enabling statutes specify
188. d at 360.
189. d at 362.
190. Id
191. Ground Air Transfer v. Westates Airlines, 899 F.2d 1269, 1272 (Ist Cir. 1990).
192. Itek Corp. v. First Natl Bank, 730 F.2d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 1984).
193. Intraworld Indus. v. Girard Trust Bank, 336 A.2d 316, 324-25 (Pa. 1975).
194. Id at 325.
195. Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 31 N.Y.S.2d 631, 634 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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that the financing will be available for enterprises that will, among other
things, create new job opportunities196 and benefit economically dis-
tressed communities.
197
Industrial development bonds would be unmarketable if they were
not secured by the known credit of a bank through a letter of credit.' 98
The court in Diamond Machine Co. v. Casco Northern Bank (In re Dia-
mond Machine Co.)' 99 recognized the strong public policy behind the
Maine Finance Authority Act in refusing to enjoin payment on a letter of
credit issued for the account of a bankrupt debtor.20° The stated purpose
of the Finance Authority Act was to stimulate a larger flow of private
investment funds and to increase the access of smaller businesses to fi-
nancing at reasonable terms and rates.20' The debtor argued that pay-
ment of the letter of credit would severely jeopardize its efforts to
reorganize. 20 2 The court refused the debtor's request, noting that letters
of credit have a unique and favored status in business and commerce.203
The court held that granting an injunction would create havoc in the
bond markets and defeat the public policy behind the state statute.2 4
If letters of credit could be enjoined simply because of an account
party's bankruptcy, they would lose their defining features of indepen-
dence and prompt payment. There is a great public interest in upholding
letters of credit because without them, many types of financing could not
occur. Furthermore, the policies behind the Bankruptcy Code are not
defeated by upholding letters of credit because creditors are permitted, in
structuring loan transactions, to bargain for better positions in bank-
ruptcy. For instance, secured creditors and unsecured creditors are not
treated equally-secured creditors receive the value of their security
while unsecured creditors may only receive a small percentage of their
claims. Oversecured creditors are treated more favorably than other se-
196. See, eg., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 20, para. 3 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
197. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 91501 (West 1987).
198. Bond ratings are based on the creditworthiness of the bank issuing the letter of credit
supporting the bond. Fitch Issues LIC-Backed Bond Rating Guidelines in Light of 'Prime
Motor', LETTER oF CREDrr UPDATE (Gov't Info. Servs.) at 8, 8 (Feb. 1991).
199. 95 B.R. 255 (Bankr. D. Me. 1988). In Diamond Machine, the debtor caused a letter of
credit to be issued in favor of the indenture trustee for the bonds. The existence of the letter of
credit was a condition precedent to issuing these bonds, and the documents executed in con-
nection with the bonds stated, "Bond Purchasers are unwilling to purchase the Bonds unless
the Bonds are further secured by an irrevocable letter of credit issued by the Bank." Id. at
256.
200. Id
201. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 962 (West Supp. 1992).
202. Diamond Mach., 95 B.R. at 257.
203. Id.
204. Id at 258.
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cured creditors in that oversecured creditors are entitled to postpetition
interest. Creditors who obtain guarantees from nondebtor guarantors
may be paid notwithstanding the automatic stay. Letters of credit should
be treated like any of these other loss-limiting devices. Therefore, credi-
tors who insist on receiving letters of credit should receive immediate
payment notwithstanding the debtor's bankruptcy filing.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts faced with the question of whether to enjoin letters of credit
in bankruptcy cases have received scant statutory guidance. Left to their
own devices, courts have misapplied the Code and improperly applied
the balancing test for injunctions. Applying the anti-ipso facto provi-
sions of § 365 to letters of credit is inappropriate because the purpose of a
letter of credit is to shift all risks of nonperformance from the beneficiary
to the issuer. As for the test for injunction, the only prong of the test
that a debtor could likely satisfy would be that of likelihood of success on
the merits-a successful reorganization. It is unlikely that a debtor
would suffer irreparable harm as a result of payment of a letter of credit,
because all actions against the debtor will be stayed while the bankruptcy
case is pending. Further, the harm to the creditor who asked for the
letter of credit will be great, for the creditor will be deprived of its bar-
gain. Finally, the public interest weighs in favor of upholding letters of
credit because of their special place in the world of finance.
Perhaps the best way to guide courts faced with this issue would be
to codify the special status of letters of credit in bankruptcy. Therefore,
the time is right for explicitly recognizing letters of credit in the Bank-
ruptcy Code by including them within the "financial accommodation"
exception to § 365(e) and by specifically prohibiting injunctions against
payment of letters of credit.
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